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“It is upon the Navy under the providence of God that the 
safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly depend” 
Preamble to articles for the first Anglo-Dutch war, 1652-54 
 
 
Abstract 
The size and strength of the Royal Navy experienced a punctuated 
evolution into the largest and most powerful Navy in the world by 
1815.  
Most historians tend to represent its superiority in conflicts at sea as 
an indication of several factors that would be conceptualized by 
economists as residuals in a production function, namely: better 
technologies, efficient seamanship, bravery in battle, the Nelson 
factor, strong logistical support on shore and latterly well designed 
systems of economic incentives.  But are these factors anywhere 
near sufficient to explain the Royal Navy's relative prowess over rival 
fleets? This paper argues that the fiscal and financial institutions 
based upon a political consensus for a sustained uplift in state 
expenditures on the largest standing fleet of warships in Europe was 
created during an interregnum of Republican rule, carried forward by 
the Stuarts and exploited to reach its full potential between the 
Glorious Revolution (1688) and the Congress of Vienna (1815). The 
Royal Navy’s protection promoted development and consolidation of 
the realm’s extensive maritime sector that, in turn, sustained the 
largest fleet of battleships on call for defense and aggression in 
Europe and across the oceans of the world economy. 
 
 
One of the major unsolved (perhaps insoluble problems) in 
European history is concerned with the design of a narrative, concluding 
with a  story  that might explain the rise of the Royal Navy to a position of  
                                                            
∗ To be published in R. Unger (ed) Shipping, Efficiency and Economic Growth, 1350-
1800  forthcoming Brill 2010.  Not to be cited without permission from Patrick O’Brien 
(p.o’brien@lse.ac.uk) 
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hegemony over all other rival navies. That evolution and outcome 
occurred between the first Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54) and final victory at 
Trafalgar and Waterloo over the course of a Second Hundred Years War 
with France from 1689-1815.1 Thereafter, from the Congress of Vienna in 
1815 to the entry of the United States into the Second World War, which 
paradoxically flowed from the destruction of an American fleet at Pearl 
Harbour by Japanese sea and airpower in 1941, Britain’s Royal Navy 
held indisputable command over the oceans of the world.2 
There are two possible explanations for the Navy’s climb to that 
position of hegemony. First (and with the recent publication of fiscal and 
other scattered European–wide data recording  and indicating 
expenditures on navies), few modern naval historians would be prepared 
to deny that a “very high” measure of significance must be accorded in 
the narrative to the scale, scope and persistence of investment by the 
British state in fleets of  warships and their onshore infrastructure of ports, 
docks, shipyards, bureaucratic organizations, specialized manpower , and 
other inputs required for sea power.3 Furthermore, that strategy pursued 
for the national defence of an island realm, combined effectively with 
private investment in the ships, weapons and on shore facilities of a 
national merchant marine for commerce, but also for piracy, privateering 
and other forms of predation upon foreign competitors to create a very 
                                                            
1 F. Crouzet, ‘The Second Hundred Years War with France. Some Reflexions? French 
History,  10 (1996) pp. 432-50 
2 P.K. O’Brien and A. Clesse (eds.), Two Hegemonies. Britain 1846-1914 and the 
United States, 1941-2001 (Aldershot, 2002) 
3 Nicholas Rodger writes: “British sea power benefitted essentially from a breadth and 
depth of public support which had no equivalent in any other naval power”,  N.A.M.  
Rodger, ‘Queen  Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea Power in English History’, Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society, 14 (2004), pp. 153-174. Although the concluding 
chapter of his seminal work on the history of the Royal Navy (N.A.M. Rodger, The 
Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain.  Vol. 2, 1649-1815, (London 2004) 
pp. 575-83) supports the general points made in  this paper, our emphases differ. 
Rodger’s text contains many references to the Royal Navy’s superior efficiency over 
the navies of rivals, particularly France, that may or may not turn out to be both valid 
and significant.` 
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large scale European and global multinational shipping industry for the 
kingdom. Private investment in a mercantile marine clearly supplemented 
both the defensive and offensive operations of the Royal Navy. 
Throughout the period from the Navigation Act of 1651 to victory at 
Trafalgar, flows of resources, information and nautical knowledge 
between the two sectors operated symbiotically. This connexion must 
form the core of any history of British naval success from Cromwell to 
Nelson, as well as a significant component of any rounded explanation for 
the kingdom’s precocious industrialization.4  
The graphs set out below demonstrate that quantified 
representations of  the United Kingdom’s consistently high and rising 
levels of public expenditures on the Royal Navy can: now be constructed 
(Figure 1), compared with expenditures upon military force (Figure 2), and 
albeit within an altogether less acceptable level of accuracy,  juxtaposed 
alongside outlays on gross domestic fixed capital formation by the private 
sector for the growth of the economy. (Figure 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 The argument is outlined in P.K. O’Brien. ‘Fiscal and Financial Preconditions for the 
Rise of British Naval Hegemony 1485-1815’, in J. Backhaus and N. Rodger (eds.), 
Navies and State Formation (forthcoming 2009). It will be elaborated in book form by 
the authors of this paper, The Royal Navy and the First Industrial Revolution 
(forthcoming 2010) 
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Figure 1: Trends in Expenditures on the Royal Navy 1569-1815 (Natural 
Log of Real Expenditure in £000 in Constant Prices of 1660) 
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Sources: The database has been constructed by the authors from Official and 
Secondary sources is available on request and will be included and referenced in their 
book The Royal Navy and the Industrial Revolution (forthcoming 2010) 
Notes: Nlog Expenditure: Natural logarithm of Royal Navy Expenditure in real 1660 
pounds; Nlog 20 MA Expenditure: Natural logarithm of 20 year centred moving average 
of Royal Navy Expenditure in real 1660 pounds 
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Figure 2. Proportions of Expenditures on Armed Forces Allocated to the Army 
and Navy, 1689-1815 
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Figure 3. Expenditures on the Royal Navy Compared to Conjectures for 
GDFCF, 1600-1815 
 
 
*Sources: See Figure 1 
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Figures of comparable scope and quality have neither been 
published nor collected, let alone calibrated into formats required for 
systematic and reciprocal comparisons across a relevant sample of  rival 
states with serious commitments to naval power. Although recently 
constructed estimates for expenditures undertaken by the Netherlands 
and Spain, together with some un-quantified suggestions for France 
support the view that between 1714-1800 both Bourbon monarchies 
allocated far higher proportions of their revenues to armies than to navies 
and that the absolute levels of expenditures on warships and onshore 
infrastructural support for naval operations  at sea but all three rival 
powers not only  fluctuated more sharply, decade after decade, but  they 
fell well below allocations made for the support of Britain’s Navy.5  
Furthermore,  Martin Korner’s statistics for expenditures by 
European states does not include any data to suggest that outlays by any 
other rival power even begins to match British allocations for the realms’ 
Royal Navy. 6  While Jan Glete’s  complementary research designed to 
measure the displacement tonnage of all types of warships owned and 
controlled by the English, French, Spanish, Dutch and  other maritime 
states between 1650 and 1815,  clinches  poorly quantified impressions 
derived from fiscal data that the scale of the Island kingdom’s fleet of 
                                                            
5 For Spain, vide José Jurado Sanchez, ‘Military Spending, Spending Capacity and 
Budget Constraints in Eighteenth Century Britain and Spain’, in Revista de Historia 
Economica (2009) pp 141-74 and R. Torres Sanchez, ‘Possibilities and Limits: Testing 
the Fiscal Military State in the Anglo-Spanish War of 1779-83’, in R. Torres Sanchez 
(ed.), War, State and Development. Fiscal Military States in the Eighteenth Century 
(Navarra, 2007), pp. 437-460. For France I relied upon H. Goherel,  Les tresoiries 
generaux de la Marine (Paris, 1965); M. Marion, Histoire Financière de la France 
depuis 1715 (5 vols: Paris, 1927-18), and J. Riley, The Seven Years War and the old 
Regime in France (Princeton, 1986). For the Netherlands we are grateful to Professor 
Wantje Fritschy of the  Free University of Amsterdam for allowing me to see her 
unpublished estimates of naval expenditures 1701-94.  For France, we are grateful for 
the advice of Professors Joel Felix of Reading University and Daniel Baugh of Cornell 
University. 
6 M. Korner, ‘Expenditure’, in R. Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance 
(Oxford, 1995), pp. 393-404 
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battleships armed, specialized and maintained in a state of readiness for 
warfare at sea first converged and then pulled sharply away from navies 
maintained by rivals on the mainland as well as the great agrarian 
empires of Asia. 7  
 
Figure 4: Scale of Royal and other State Navies (displacement tonnage 000s)  
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Source: Glete, J. (1993) Appendix 2. Data corresponds to “Naval strength”. England 
1500-1815, Netherlands 1650-1815, France 1620-1815 and Spain 1715-1815. 
 
Figures for the numbers and tons of armed merchant vessels, 
corsairs and privateers predating upon enemy (and neutral) merchant 
marines in wartime have not been published. 8 Nevertheless histories of 
British, French, Dutch, Iberian and other European trades, which include 
odd references to data on exports and imports by country, suggest Britain 
began to  move to the top of European league tables for trade combined 
with shipping after 1660. Unverifiable estimates for the tonnage of ships 
                                                            
7J. Glete,  Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and 
America 1500-1860 (2 vols. Stockholm, 1993), appx 2. 
8 J.S. Bromley, Corsairs and Navies (London, 1987) and J. Thompson, Mercenaries, 
Pirates and Sovereignty (Princeton, 1994) 
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included in European mercantile navies, all suggest that the scale and 
scope of the merchant ships accumulating under British ownership and 
management also exceeded the capacities for seaborne transportation 
available to any of its mainland rivals, including eventually the 
Netherlands by large and ever diverging margins. 9 
 
Figure 5. Tonnage of Ships and Number of Sailors Employed in the Maritime 
sectors (Navy + Merchant Marine) of England and the Netherlands 1575-1825 
 
Tonnage Seamen 
  English Dutch English Dutch 
1575  68,433   16,000   
1600    240,000   33,000 
1625  210,000 400,000     
1650        46,000 
1675  350,000 900,000   50,000 
1700      55,000   
1725    500,000   50,000 
1750  500,000   70,000   
1775  700,000 397,000 70,000 45,000 
1800  1,856,000   95,000   
1825  2,202,000 130,792   24,000 
 
Source: English tonnage and seamen and Dutch tonnage (Lucassen & Unger (2000)) 
and Dutch seamen (Davids (1997)) 
 
Finally disparate and unverifiable references to the numbers of 
vessels owned or leased by  “hostile” powers that were destroyed and 
captured in times of war do not suggest that the kingdom’s geopolitical 
rivals and commercial competitors  compensated for markedly lower 
investments in warships by calling upon larger fleets of privateers or well 
                                                            
9 It is difficult to construct a European-wide table of the tonnage of ships available by 
country for private seaborne commerce and transportation because data for several 
countries are not available. Furthermore definitions of mercantile marines vary by 
country and over time, and measures used to report tonnage are not consistent across 
countries or time. Vide, J. McCusker, Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic 
World (London, 1997) 
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armed merchant marines.10 All the evidence suggests a long term and 
growing divergence in the size of the navies and mercantile marines of 
the United Kingdom compared to its rivals and competitors from  the 
mainland of Europe and  the Ottoman, Mughal and Qing empires of Asia 
as well.11 
Economists will point to the probabilities that high, consistent and 
complementary investments by the public and private sectors in the ships, 
infra-structural capital and manpower required to keep naval and 
merchant marines “ship shape” for both warfare and commerce, would, in 
theory, generate several kinds of positive inter-connexions, all rigorously 
specified and labelled under such enticing taxonomies as agglomeration 
effects, network externalities and general purpose technologies.12 
Historians will only agree that modern theories seem plausible, provide 
some graphic vocabulary,  as well as a few examples, although they 
could not actually measure the increasing returns that undoubtedly 
accompanied and added to flows of benefits from Britain’s sustained 
commitment to a maritime strategy (1651-1805) for the combined defence 
and development of the Island kingdom. Nevertheless that strategy must 
be accorded a place of a real significance in explanations for the realm’s 
precocious transition, first to a commercialized and then to an industrial 
economy. Capital formation undertaken by the state, working in close 
cooperation with the private sector, in sailing ships, ports, docks, cannon, 
skilled manpower, the navigational knowledge and commercial 
                                                            
10 J. Levy, Wars in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington, 1983) 
11 L. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York, 1939) and G. Modelski and W. 
Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics (Seattle, 1993) 
12 M. Fujita, P. Krugman and A. Venables  (MIT Press, Cambridge., 2000); H. Helpman 
(ed.), General Purpose technologies (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998); J. Triole, The 
Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000) 
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organization required for international trade, combined symbiotically with 
national defence and mercantilist warfare at sea.13 
Yet there has also been a clear and persistent strand of, let us call 
it patriotic  writing about the Navy, well supported by references to  
bellicose politicians as well as xenophobic Britons of the day. That history 
has been  consolidated by into an all too rarely controverted national myth 
that continues to represent the manifest successes of the Royal Navy 
over a long sequence of some ten major wars (1652-1802-15) as a record 
of superior efficiency and organization over the fleets of the Netherlands, 
Spain, France, Denmark, Russia, the United States and other rivals in 
conflicts at sea. Too many historians continue to offer such under-
specified and under-quantified explanations for success that downgrade 
the significance of resources. 
Unfortunately the Royal Navy’s relative efficiency could never be 
validated or invalidated by fitting anything approximating to production 
functions to the achievements of a sample of rival European navies. In 
theory production functions measure relative levels of success in 
converting inputs of capital, labour and other resources into  variegated 
“outputs” of “public goods” such as external security, protection for the 
mercantile marine, colonization, the transportation of troops, victories in 
battles at seas, successful diplomatic threats and other elements of an 
interrelated set of multiple objectives serving national interests.14 
Another potential but less rigorous, demanding and inconclusive 
approach to the problem of British naval efficiency is to proceed by way of 
systematic and reciprocal comparisons to  at least clarify the precise 
                                                            
13 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution’, Department of 
Economic History, London School of Economics GEHN Working Paper 23/06 (2006) 
14 This was appreciated by N.A.M. Rodger, ‘Form and Function in European Navies, 
1660-1815’ in L. Akveld et al (eds.,) in In het kielzog: Maritiem-historische Studies 
(Amsterdam, 2003) pp. 85-97 and N.A.M. Rodger, ‘Sea Power and Empire’, in P. 
Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol.2 (Oxford, 1998), p. 169-
183  
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location and possible significance of particular examples of the relative 
prowess embodied in rival navies. Such comparisons rarely appear, 
however, in the voluminous and scholarly bibliography for European naval 
history, because that library has been largely constructed upon a country 
by country basis, often without adequate reference to the volume, value 
and quality of resources placed at the disposal of all national navies for 
the various  missions that they undertook to achieve the multiple 
objectives defined by monarchs, oligarchies and their advisers.15 
Simply to expose an under-exploited potential for comparative 
history, to assist a growing group of European naval historians who are 
providing research into the relative logistical efficiencies of national 
navies, and as a challenge to scholars who are bunkered in national 
archives,  two  “outsiders” from economic history propose to formulate a 
provisional and contestable argument, based largely upon English 
secondary sources, that the extant  and largely a priori case made for the 
ostensibly superior efficiency  of the British navy is at present unproven. 
Furthermore, it appears to them that its margins of efficiency over rival 
navies  from 1653-1805 were in all probability rather small. If this turns 
out to be correct, it implies that Britain’s rise to a position of geopolitical 
hegemony was the product of access to a higher volume of fiscal and 
financial resources, allocated to build up an almighty navy.16 
Effective naval power emanated as the outcomes of “systems” 
established, funded and maintained by states for the mobilization, 
combination and coordination of several analytically separable inputs 
required for a range of different national objectives, for example, the 
                                                            
15  M. Acerra et al (eds.,) Les marines de guerre européenes XVII-XVIIIe siecles  (Paris, 
1998) and L. Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914 (London, 2001) 
16 Europe’s naval historians have latterly become more engaged with comparative 
history. M. Acerra and A. Zysberg, L’esssor des marines de guerre européenes vers 
1680-vers 1790 (Paris, 1997) and R. Knight, ‘The Fleets of Trafalgar: The Margin of 
Superiority’, in D. Cannadine (ed.), Trafalgar in History (New York, 2006) pp. 61-78 
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Royal Navy’s absolute priority was to preclude invasion of the Isles by 
sea. Its secondary missions included protection for the realm’s 
international commerce, extensive fishing industry and coastal trades; 
predation upon enemy and other potentially hostile commerce in wartime; 
offshore support for allies and colonies; the transportation of troops, the 
bombardment  of enemy bases, coastal fortification and maritime cities; 
the containment of smuggling and backing for gunboat diplomacy.17 
Clearly the scale and scope of the principal capital goods in the 
form of national armed sailing fleets evolved gradually to include a mix of 
capabilities required to perform several and specialized tasks. Heavily 
armed cruisers could not be expected to pursue and intercept the cutters 
used by smugglers to deliver cargoes of illegal merchandise to the home 
market. Thus, the mix of capabilities embodied in warships constructed 
and/or commissioned for service by the Royal Navy, and for that matter 
all other European navies must be related for purposes of comparison to 
their evolving and differentiated missions on behalf of states. 
By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the tonnage of faster and 
lighter frigates, sloops, brigs and cutters at the disposal of the Royal Navy 
as a proportion of the total tonnage,  had risen sharply from around 15% 
in 1710 to 43% a century later.18 These ratios indicate that the security of 
the realm provided by larger scale, heavily armed ships of the line, 
strategically positioned off shore probably absorbed a diminishing but still 
cost effective proportion of total expenditures on the Navy. Given the high 
probability of increasing returns to combined public and private 
investment in capital goods for maritime operations,  an island power 
could, over time, maintain external security by allocating  reduced shares 
                                                            
17 D. Baugh, ‘Great Britain’s Blue Water Policy, 1689-1815’, in International History 
Review, X (1988), pp. 33-58 
18 R.W. Unger, ‘Warships, cargo ships and Adam Smith: trade and government in the 
eighteenth century’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 92, 1 (2006). 41-59 and R. Harding, The 
Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815 (Basingstoke, 1995) 
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of the fiscal and financial resources available to its armed forces for that 
key purpose and reallocate a rising proportion to other more profitable 
mercantilist objectives, as well as that other all important public good – 
the maintenance of internal order. (Vide Figure 2) 
At present historians of the British navy have offered little by way of 
hard evidence to suggest that the mix of warships available to rival fleets 
of France, Spain and other powers were sub-optimal for the strategic 
objectives pursued by their rulers.19  They have not, moreover, been able 
to demonstrate that warships built in the Hanoverian states own or in 
private yards for service in the Royal Navy were either of consistently 
superior designs for comparable purposes, included more effective 
energy systems, that is sails, masts, rigging, rudders and pumps for the 
harnessing of wind and water power, or deployed more  technologically 
advanced ordnance than rival warships charged with similar missions.20 
Although no other state relied anywhere nearly as much as Britain upon 
its navy for external security or sought as consistently and tenaciously to 
secure command of the seas,  the limited range of modern secondary 
sources for European-wide comparisons do not demonstrate that British 
built warships and their guns enjoyed protracted periods of technological 
advantage over ships built and cannon cast in yards and foundries from 
other parts of the continent.21 
On the contrary, it has not been difficult for historians of the Royal 
Navy to cite a long list of complaints and anxieties which refer to the 
                                                            
19 N.A.M. Rodger,  The Command of the Ocean, a Naval History of Britain, vol. 2, 
1649-1815 (London, 2004) 
20 B. Lavery, Ships of the Line. The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-1850 (London, 
1983), and B. Lavery, The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War 1660-1815 
(London, 1987) 
21 B. Lavery, Nelson’s Navy. The Ships, the Men and Organization 1793-1815 (London, 
1989) and N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain, vol. 
2, 1649-1815 (London, 2004) and L.D. Ferreiro, Ships and Science. The Birth of Naval 
Architecture (Cambridge, Mass, 2006) 
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qualities of warships built in French and Spanish yards.22 Contemporaries 
who made such invidious comparisons did not, however, consistently 
compare like with like or consider the trade-offs involved in the 
construction of ships for speed, which was a French preoccupation, for 
convoy duties across the Atlantic which was a Spanish priority, and for 
the durability required to remain for long periods at sea in all weathers 
and to engage enemies at close quarters in duals of strength and 
endurance, which were the essential prerequisites for both the strategy 
and the formalist line ahead tactics for the battles the Royal Navy 
endeavoured, in principle, to pursue between 1689 and 1815.23 
All European warships embodied variations in their capacities for 
speed, manoeuvrability, endurance, firepower and for facilities 
accommodating large crews in confined and unhealthy spaces to sail 
ships and fire cannon. As floating fortresses European warships 
increased in scale and capabilities to carry one to three decks of 32 to 
over 100 guns, to remain stable on the waves  and to withstand the 
concentrated impact of heavy cannon balls weighing 9lbs to 42lbs. 
Shipwrights tried to maintain balances between the weight of cannon, the 
height and complexities of rigging and the size and shape of hulls. Big 
warships took several years to build and could remain on active duty for 
up to and, in some cases (with refits) for more than 20 years. To remain 
                                                            
22 C. Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century (London, 
2004) ; D.H. Roberts (ed.), Eighteenth Century Shipbuilding. Remarks on the Navies of 
the English and the Dutch (Rotherfield, 1992) and J. Meyer and M. Acerra, Histoire de 
la Marine Francaise des Origines a nos  Jours (Rennes, 1994) 
23 D. Baugh, ‘The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution in J. Hill (ed.),  
Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy (Oxford, 1995); J. Boudriot and H. Berti, 
L’art Ilerie de mer: marine francaise 1650-1850I (Paris, 199) and ; D. Goodman, 
Spanish Naval Power 1589-1665 (Cambridge, 1996) 
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at sea ships required regular triennial servicing in dockyards ashore and 
complete refits at least every 4-5 years.24 
Throughout the age of sailing fleets the design and construction of 
warships and their ordnance occurred within the framework of two 
competitive multinational industries: shipbuilding and armaments. Both 
seem to have been marked by slow incremental rates of technical 
innovation and compared to other sectors of manufacturing industry, a 
relatively rapid diffusion of available knowledge, skills and techniques. 
Those features moved both state and mercantile marines to broadly 
similar levels of technological efficiency.25 Diffusion occurred through 
purchase and hire, but often b y way of the capture of foreign models as 
well as the migration of shipwrights, seamen and gun founders across 
frontiers.26 Evidence suggests that the British navy derived some 
temporary competitive advantages from a relatively rapid deployment of 
copper sheathing and from investment in dry docks that preserved ships 
timbers and speeded up completion and turnabout times for the building, 
repair, cleaning and maintenance of hulls.27 Some proportion of the guns 
mounted on ships of the Royal Navy on service during the wars from 
                                                            
24 O. Warner, Fighting Sail: Three Hundred Years of Warfare at Sea (London, 1979) 
and B. Lavery, Ships of the Line. The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-1850 
(London, 1983) 
25 D. Lyon, The Sailing Navy. All the Ships of the Royal Navy. Built, Purchased and 
Captured (Conway, 1993) and   
B. Lavery, The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War 1660-1815 (London, 1987) 
26 B. Lavery (ed.), The Ships of the Line (2 vols, London 1983-84); J. Glete, Navies and 
Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building (Stockholm, 1993) and  R. Unger, Dutch 
Shipbuilding before 1800 (Amsterdam, 1978) 
27 D. Baugh, ‘Naval power. What gave the British Navy Superiority?’ in L. Prados De La 
Escosura (ed.), Exceptionalism and Industrialization. Britain and its European Rivals 
1688-1815 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 235-57; R. Knight, ‘The Introduction of Copper 
Sheathing into the Royal Navy, 1779-86’, in Mariners Mirror, 59 (1973) pp, 299-309 
and R. Knight, ‘The Building and Maintenance of the British Fleet during the Anglo-
French Wars 1688-1815’, in M. Acerra et at (eds.), Les Marines de Guerre 
Européenes. XVII-XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 1985), pp. 35-50 
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1776 to 1815 may have been superior to enemy cannon.28 In general, 
and given the multinational nature of Europe’s shipbuilding, shipping and 
armaments industries, the modern secondary literature dealing with early 
modern warships and naval artillery does not prima facie support a case 
for sustained and cumulative technological leadership enjoyed by Britain 
either in the construction of warships or in the design, manufacture and 
mounting of cannon for more accurate delivery of destructive energy at 
safer distances, over the period it took for the Royal Navy to achieve 
command of the oceans.29 
At the very least, while its significance remains an open question 
for  research and debate, technological retardation appears to be 
something of a short chapter in conceivable explanations for the failures 
of Britain’s rivals to contain the long run success of the Royal Navy as the 
instrument of what many European statesmen and commentators of the 
age regarded as “maritime despotism”.30 An alternative explanation is that 
more of the Royal Navy’s triumphs at sea could be attributed, as many 
naval historians are disposed to argue, to the superior skills of British 
seamen, the leadership and managerial qualities of their officers and to 
features of organization aboard the floating fortresses that might be 
represented as “British” and virtually particular to the operation of 
warships by the Royal Navy.31  
Before investigating the potential quality of British seamen, 
something  quantitative and  familiar should be repeated about Europe’s 
                                                            
28 B. Lavery, Nelson’s Navy, the Ships, Men and Organization 1793-1815 (London, 
1989) and N.A.M. Rodger, Command of the Oceans, pp. 420-422. 
29 My generalization is based on the fine scholarship of Brian Lavery, Dan Baugh, 
Nicholas Rodger and a collection of articles edited by R.D. Smith, British Naval 
Armaments (London, 1989) plus J. Boudriot and H. Berti, L’artillence de mer. Marine 
Franchise 1650-1850  (Paris, 1992) 
30 A. Harvey, A Collision of Empires. Britain in Three World Wars, 1793-1945 (London, 
1992) 
31 B. Lavery (ed.), Shipboard Life and Organization 1731-1815 (Aldershot, 1998). Dan 
Baugh in a letter to me in  ??? to this view 
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evolving stocks and supply curves for this scarce category of labour. 
Once again it is unfortunate that statistics for the changing size and 
occupational distribution of seamen available to Venice, Portugal, 
Holland, Spain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Russia, the Ottoman 
Empire and other states with ambitions to acquire naval power cannot be 
tabulated here. Nevertheless, any review of published, but again, largely 
descriptive, studies of Europe’s early modern trade overseas suggests 
that the “pools” of seamen engaged directly and indirectly with all forms of 
waterborne transportation could already have been larger for England 
and its colonies than from anywhere on the mainland, even before the 
promulgation of the First Navigation Act by the Republic in 1651. 
Thereafter, British supplies of manpower and other resources linked to all 
forms of economic and geopolitical activities at sea increased in line with 
the growth of the kingdom’s exports, imports, re-exports, coastal, riverine 
and fishing trades, as well as warfare at sea. For the manning and control 
of warships, the Royal Navy could draw upon an ever increasing stock of 
human capital embodied in seamen and officers from the realm’s and the 
empire’s expanding merchant marine which increased in scale from an 
estimated 340,000 tons of ships in  1686 to 1,200,000 tons in  1790. 32  
With the possible exception of the Dutch navy, which used higher 
wages to recruit sailors from the maritime regions of Germany, 
Scandinavia and Russia, as well as the Netherlands, supplies of seamen 
potentially available to all navies seem to have  been an omnipresent and 
widespread problem.33. Nevertheless, for Britain the supply remained 
elastic enough  to man larger and larger fleets with seamen from the 
                                                            
32 J. Lucassen and R. Unger. “Labour Productivity in Ocean Shipping 1500-1850”, 
International Journal of Maritime History, XII, 2 (2000), 127-141, and the manpower 
data cited in several articles in P.C. van Royen, J.R. Bruijn and J. Lucassen, eds., 
Those Emblems of Hell 1580-1870. Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market (St Johns, 
1997) 
33 D. Baugh, “The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution”, in J. Hill (ed.), 
Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy (Oxford, 1995), pp. 120-60 
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realm’s merchant marine who were readily re-employed by the private 
sector at the end of conflicts.34 This well recognized allocation and 
reallocation of manpower between the merchant and Royal Navy carried 
advantages for both the security of the kingdom and growth of its 
economy.35  Seamen, both officers and men, remained at sea in times of 
war and peace over long stretches of their working lives, acquiring skills 
and accumulating relevant experience. Between the navy and the  
merchant marine connexions remained virtually continuous, which 
certainly promoted flows of tacit but useful and productive knowledge. 
Across the board the public services and private enterprise shared the 
costs of training able seamen, gunners, navigators, masters and 
commanders. Furthermore, the redeployment of the king’s sailors 
obviated those familiar problems of disorder and crime associated with 
the demobilization of troops embodying redundant skills and expertise in 
violence at the end of the wars.36 
Unsurprisingly the historiography concerned with the crews of 
warships continues to be inordinately concerned with officers, particularly 
admirals. Only a handful of books contains research into the relative 
skills, pay, experience and motivation of able, ordinary and other seamen 
who often served in several European, including the British navies and 
merchant marines over this period.37 
A priori economic theory it is true is designed for the analysis of 
modern free labour markets. Nevertheless, that theory  should certainly 
not lead historians to any expectation that methods favoured by the 
British Admiralty for recruitment and payment of sailors, methods which 
remained virtually unreformed throughout decades of victories at sea, 
                                                            
34 R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries 
(Newton Abbot, 1972) and R. Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990) 
35 G. Scammel, Seafaring, Sailors and Trade 1450-1750 (Aldershot, 2003) Chs 4 and 5 
36 C. Emsley, Crime and Society in England 1750-1900 (Basingstoke, 1987) 
37 P. Earle, Sailors. English Merchant Seamen 1650-1775 (London, 1998) 
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could be represented as “superior” for the employment, commitment, 
training and efficiency of the workforces that manned warships in the 
service of the Royal Navy, that is compared to jobs in the merchant 
marine or  other European navies and merchant marines.38 
On the contrary, published evidence on wages and conditions of 
employment offered to British crews of warships suggest that few men 
with the experience and skills required for work at sea could have been 
attracted on economic grounds to serve the Crown in times of peace and 
fewer still during periods of war when differentials in pay and conditions of 
employment on merchant ships engaged in trade, and still more 
employed in armed vessels active in privateering, looked far better than 
anything on offer from the Royal Navy.39 
For example, and at the outbreak of every war, wages of seamen in 
the merchant marine rose sharply to reflect uplifts in the risks and costs in 
transporting merchandise by sea as well as the impact of intensified 
demands from the Royal Navy for the thousands of extra seamen 
required to man the fleet commissioned for immediate active service and 
in anticipation of future demands from warships under accelerated 
construction.40  Until the mutinies  of 1797 Parliament maintained the real 
wage rates of ordinary and able seamen, which included food, medical 
treatment, deferred pay, with no provision for clothing,  at levels fixed in 
1652  though  revised in detail in 1686.  Over time the regulated diets of 
fresh food, cleaner spaces and safety available on the king’s warships 
compared favourably with conditions provided by smaller, more 
vulnerable and perhaps less healthy ships of the merchant navy. 
                                                            
38 The secondary sources are far from adequate. But vide: J.S. Bromley (ed.), The 
Manning of the Royal Navy  
1693-1873 (London, 1974) and J. Glete, Navies and Nations 
39 S. Gradish, The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years War  (London, 
1980) and D. Baugh, ‘The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution’, pp. 120-
160. 
40 P. Earle, Sailors, English Merchant Seamen 1650-1775 
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Nevertheless, mariners who continued to work in the private sector could 
not be subjected to the same discipline, including harsh penalties such as 
mandatory death for eight crimes, optional for another eleven and 
commonplace floggings for a variety of offences; far longer periods of 
confinement aboard ships; out in all seasons and often on unhealthy 
stations in tropical waters or even in home ports where leave ashore 
occurred at the discretion of captains.41 
Although conditions improved over time and a pay rise of 23%  
which followed the mutinies of 1797 and a further 16% came on stream a 
year after Trafalgar, no economist comparing wage differentials and 
conditions for employment across the two marines, could be surprised 
that a majority of the workforce who defended the realm, its property, 
religion, freedoms and system of parliamentary governance from French 
and other “despotisms” on the mainland consisted of a majority of 
seamen who had, by one means or another, been impressed, that is 
coerced, into serving their king and country and were only released for 
leave during or at the end of conflicts at the discretion of the Royal Navy. 
Tom Paine and other radicals of the time pointed to the anomaly, but 
mariners were by no means the only occupation or social group among 
Britain’s eighteenth century workforce, burdened by loss of autonomy and 
the maintenance of strict controls over labour.42 
Parliaments grumbled, but refused  that is before passing quota 
acts in 1795, to emulate French policies of registration and systematic 
conscription, let alone countenance Dutch systems of paying market 
wages. Ministers recognized that the inefficiencies associated with 
impressment operated as a self-reinforcing institution that at one and the 
                                                            
41 C. Lloyd, The British Seaman: A Social Survey (London, 1968) and N. Eder, Crime 
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same time forced up wages for the mercantile marine and reduced 
incentives for the Royal Navy to save scarce labour.  Nevertheless, 
Parliament legislated only to circumscribe the operations of this attack on 
free labour in ways that mediated between the increasing and urgent 
needs of the navy with the competitive, but economically, pressing 
demands of overseas and internal trade upon which the tax revenues of 
the state also depended. For example, the law limited liability for 
impressments to mariners who, except at critical moments of “embargoes 
on trade”, as in  1717 and 1779, could  not be forcibly removed from 
employment on outbound merchant ships, fishing vessels, colliers, ferries, 
boats servicing naval  demands for food and raw materials or only with 
difficulty from colonial shipping.43  Sensibly, apprehended smugglers 
were sent to sea, but the Admiralty retained antipathies towards criminals
and other “misfits” that the poor law and other local authorities offered
service. The Navy did recruit and train a considerable number of boys 
from the lower classes and transformed  an unknown number of 
landsmen taken by press gangs into seamen. It also increased supplies 
of trained labour available to the maritime sector of the economy as 
ordinary or even as able seamen, over spells of intensive training  for 
those men and boys, 3-6 months,  in a “boarding” school  which was a 
warship at sea that it took to produce a competent mariner. 
 
 for 
                                                           
The skills required to operate the energy systems of warships, that 
is their top and mainsails, took far  more training and experience to 
acquire. So did the technical know-how of carpenters, coopers, caulkers, 
rope makers, bakers, cooks, coxswains, boatswains, armourers, other 
artisans and, above all, lead gunners found among the recognized and 
differentially remunerated hierarchy of skills employed abroad all 
 
43 C. Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century (London, 
2006) 
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European warships. Over the long run impressments worked out because 
the number of seamen in service rose from 48,000 in 1713 to 327,000 a 
century later and the ratio of foreigners aboard ships of the Royal Navy, 
still around 15% at that time,  had fallen sharply from the years of King 
William’s war in the 1690s. 44 Nevertheless, manning the fleet remained 
as the key problem confronting the Admiralty throughout the period of 
Britain’s rise to hegemony at sea. To cope with periodic but sudden 
demands for large numbers of extra men, the Navy supplemented 
impressments with incentives, including: bounties to all who 
“volunteered”, promoting able seamen to petty officer levels, allowing 
seamen derisory shares in prize money and opportunities  to serve under 
captains of their choice, in order to attract labour of the required calibre to 
“volunteer” and to remain on duty with the King’s fleet. Yet on any ex post 
inspection the incentives offered to seafarers and other men under threat 
of impressments do not look enticing. 45  The bounties paid to “volunteers” 
who “enlisted” amounted to around one third of a year’s wages for an able 
seaman, 22% for an ordinary seaman and 11% for a landsman. There 
was also a possibility of receiving , along with the rest of a fortunate crew, 
a personal share of the meagre 12.5% of the total imputed value of 
enemy ships, guns and cargoes allocated to seamen abroad warships 
lucky enough to capture prizes. For example, the men who fought at 
Trafalgar took home about £10 each. The incentives offered to the 
workforce as a whole do not appear to be anything like as attractive as 
rewards offered to officers. Although seamen could, and did, compete to 
be promoted to warrant officers and become eligible for an enhanced 
share of the  prize money allocated for the destruction, or better still, the 
capture of enemy warships or merchant vessels at sea. They also look 
                                                            
44 D. Baugh, ‘The Eighteenth Century Navy’, pp. 120-160 
45 C. Prendergast, ‘The provision of incentives in firms’, in Journal of Economic 
Literature, 37 (1999), pp. 7-63 
  22
much less attractive than either the  booty that privateers could expect to 
expropriate on risky voyages of predation or the higher wages, softer 
discipline and guaranteed spells ashore for seamen who avoided press 
gangs and remained with the merchant marine. 46  
Incentives helped, but the regime for impressments coupled with 
severe  punishments for desertion remained vital for manning the fleets of 
warships and their increasing complement of cannon, maintained in 
commission and at sea for ever longer spells throughout the eight wars 
fought by the kingdom between 1689 and 1815.  Jobs and service with 
the Royal Navy promoted some accumulation of human capital, including 
skills and self-discipline, utilized for the development of an interdependent 
maritime, urban and industrial economy. But for this age of mercantilism 
and warfare it was the effective defence of the homeland, victories at sea 
and a succession of favourable peace treaties that provided most of the 
essential geopolitical  and institutional preconditions for the continued 
expansion of the country’s exports, imports and re-exports which 
promoted a cumulative process of expansion for Britain’s shipping and 
shipbuilding industries. By the Seven Years War, if not before, the capital 
and manpower employed in this sector had  already matured into the 
largest scale industry for maritime enterprise in Europe. Symbiotic 
connexions of the merchant marine with the Royal Navy and to national 
defence allowed for allocations and reallocations of manpower between 
the services with increasing facility and on a scale that could not be 
matched by rival powers and economies from the mainland.  
Perhaps as many naval historians and recently an American 
economist assert, the crews aboard British warships might have been 
more skilful and better motivated in the performance of their “duties” than 
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French, Spanish, Dutch and other sailors. Nevertheless, any survey of 
pay, including prize money, prospects for promotion and other conditions 
of employment for a workforce recruited and run by the British state under 
a regime of coercion and servitude transfers the onus of proof to those 
who make such theoretically implausible assertions and often without 
reference to the marine sectors of rival countries. 47 
At present few comparative histories concerned with the motivation 
and skills of seamen are available. 48 Meanwhile contrasts are more 
readily documented by referencing published historical research into the 
officer corps of the Royal and other navies. Officers were responsible for 
maintaining and improving organizational structures and established 
practices for the management of warships, for ordnance and for their 
crews of young potentially insubordinate men with ostensibly strong 
incentives to shirk, free ride, play for safety and to risk desertion. 
Unless male bonding, pride, loyalty and patriotism and other touted 
propensities of jack tars are recognized as significant for the efficiency of 
crews working and living together in the highly regimented confines of 
British warships, the “weight” of incentives designed by the Admiralty to 
elicit high standards of performance at sea seem to have been 
concentrated to an overwhelming degree upon a hierarchy of professional 
officers. 49  Most of these young men were from gentry or middling orders 
of society and, increasingly as time passed, a rising proportion came from 
“naval families”.  Some, but not many and usually from up the social scale 
entered the service after three years education at the Royal Naval 
Academy established in 1737. The majority aspiring to be upwardly 
                                                            
47 P.C. Van Royen et al (eds.), Those Emblems of Hell European Sailors in the 
Maritime Labour market 1570-1870’ 
48 K. Davids, ‘Maritime Labour in the Netherlands’ and S. Palmer and D. Williams, 
‘British Sailors 1775-1870’ in Van Royen et al (eds.), Those Emblems of Hell. 
49 D. Syrett and P.M. Di Nardo, The Commissioned Sea. Officers of the Royal Navy 
(London, 1994)  
  24
mobile enlisted as midshipmen  at ages between 12 and 15 and without 
payment of premia normally demanded for training in other professions. 
Over a period of six to seven years English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh 
youths acquired the knowledge and became experienced and qualified 
enough in navigation, the handling of sails and rigging, gunnery, 
seamanship and leadership to sit the examination for promotion to the 
rank of lieutenant and to become “eligible” to command a warship. The 
acquisition of the range of skills required to sail, navigate and enter 
battles which involved the coordination of complex structures, sailing on 
choppy waters, using unpredictable energy systems,  superintending 
ships loaded with ordnance and enclosed with crews of hundreds of “un-
free” seamen aboard floating fortresses of different “rates”, that is of 
varied  types, sizes and capacities – must have been no small managerial 
achievement. 50  
To display competence in an examination became a necessary, but 
hardly a sufficient  condition for promotion. Strong recommendations from 
the candidates’ captains and confirmation from the Admiralty were also 
required, before young men around the age of 20 received certification to 
run their own ships. Thereafter, calls to command only came to the 
minority who secured patronage and preferment, primarily from their 
professional peers within the Navy, but for an unmeasured but possibly 
non-trivial number of cases  also through the influence of aristocrats and 
politicians of the day. 51 Although only a tiny percentage of officers ever 
climbed from the ranks to commissioned officers, within the constraints of 
this ancien regime the Royal Navy seems to have moved further up the 
ladder towards meritocracy than the army and most other agencies of 
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state, that is except for the department of Excise. According to  several 
authorities, the hierarchy in charge of running the Navy remained less 
inclined to select management teams in charge of expensive warships on 
grounds of birth and resisted or manipulated politicised and aristocratic  
systems of preferment, more effectively and consistently than the 
admiralties of Spain, Venice, Portugal, Denmark and  France but only 
before the Revolution, but not Holland or the United States.52 Their views 
are not, however, based on the range of and depth of comparative 
historical research to be anything more than conjectures. 
Whether the Admiralty in London had designed and maintained an 
incentive system and contracts for its officers, that, on a priori grounds 
could be represented as superior to the systems of rival navies also 
remains to be investigated, perhaps in the vocabularies of tournament 
and other incentive theories displayed in the mathematical forms 
discussed by economists. 53 
Meanwhile the efforts of the Lords of the Admiralty to recruit and 
retain talented and ambitious young men received support from the high 
and rising status that society accorded to posts in the Navy. For good 
reasons “Britons” rejoiced in their floating fortresses and the public 
certainly conferred approbation on the officers and seamen for defending  
the realm, protecting commerce and for the delivery of value for the 
money that they surrendered as taxes. 54   An increasingly xenophobic 
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nation became entranced with the power of their navy to inflict a long 
series of humiliating defeats on Catholic enemies and economic 
competitors. Almost nobody inside or outside Parliament questioned the 
need to spend ever increasing sums of money to construct, man and 
maintain warships that, as records of victories at sea and balance sheets 
of ships lost, destroyed and captured show, remained decade after 
decade superior to the achievements of rival navies. 55 Monarchs, 
ministers, Parliament, clergy, the press, poets, novelists, playwrights and 
the public at large displayed nothing but pride in the officers and seamen 
who defended their liberties, religion, properties and interests overseas. 
Tropes, images, medals,  paintings, fictional heroes celebrating 
Britannia’s “rule of the waves” its “ship of state”, “gallant officers” and 
“jolly jack tars” proliferated across the classes and testify to a patriotic 
consensus of social approbation for a dominant, ostensibly well managed 
and victorious navy, long before Nelson appeared on the scene to provide 
more than a century of security for Britain and its empire that followed 
from “final” victory at Trafalgar. 56  
That popularity did not translate either into the repeal of 
impressment, higher wages for seamen, or to generous salaries for a 
gallant corps of officers. As apprentices, midshipmen who, along with all 
other officers, purchased their own food and clothing, existed for years on 
virtually the same “real wage” as an able seaman. That was somewhere 
between 30 and 45 shillings a month and roughly equivalent to levels of 
remuneration in money and kind, paid to agricultural labourers. Before 
revisions in pay in 1797 and 1806, lieutenants received 112 to 140 
shillings a month and captains 168 to 560 shillings, depending on the 
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scale of armaments that the ships they commanded carried. Only 
commissioned officers received half pay when they were “on call” on 
shore. 57 
Apart from acquiring status as “warriors” and aspiring “gentry” in 
the service of their king and country, the most widely publicized incentive 
for young men already born some way up the social scale to pursue 
careers in the Royal Navy was the prospect of making fortunes from the 
capture and sale of “prizes” particularly rival warships, but also, with 
considerably less risk, enemy merchant vessels with their cargoes as well 
as helpless neutrals suspected of running “contraband” to Britain’s 
enemies in wartime. Given that the scale of rewards that could accrue 
from the capture of hostile ships and their cargoes, were carefully 
calibrated by rank  and that  failures to engage with enemy warships 
could be severely punished as cowardice, it seems that the Admiralties of 
the day maintained in place a clear progression of material incentives that 
prima facie provided “significant encouragement” for midshipmen to 
endure six or seven years on low pay to make it to lieutenant and for an 
elastic supply of commissioned lieutenants to compete for preferment and 
patronage from their professional peers in order to receive the call to take 
command of warships, preferably  frigates, of the scale and/or speed 
likely to capture valuable prizes, and for captains to impress admirals and 
the Admiralty with loyalty, and above all, with personal records of victories 
and captures to suggest that they might be entrusted to move to the apex 
of the pyramid and command entire squadrons and even fleets of 
warships. 58 
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Although scales for incentives changed over time the principles 
maintained are captured by “modal” percentages that indicate that around 
half of all prize money flowing as rewards for naval successes at sea 
accrued to admirals and captains,  a further 25% to other commissioned 
officers, 12.5% to warrant officers and the rest to the crews of victorious 
ships. Thus the distribution of rewards looks redolent of incentive and 
bonus systems maintained by modern Anglo-American business 
corporations, and reified until recently  by some economists from those 
cultures as optimal for efficiency. Whether the Royal Navy’s prize or 
tournament system playing on the decisions of its officers can be 
represented as a peculiarly “British” institution that made some 
appreciable difference to the efficient delivery of violence at sea or varied 
in significant and ostensibly positive ways from comparable systems 
maintained by French, Spanish, Dutch and other rival navies, has not yet 
been clarified. 59 
British naval historians are inclined to assert that among the officer 
classes who managed European fleets, service with the Royal Navy 
tended to confer higher rewards, status and job satisfaction at lower 
levels of risk from disease and violent death in action than service with 
rival  navies. Many have also represented naval warfare as a process 
where repeated victories at sea cumulated into a “culture” of aggressive 
and successful risk taking of the “entrepreneurial” style displayed by 
Nelson and his captains at Trafalgar. 60  Perhaps such “cultures” of 
success breeding more success are not given the weight they warrant in 
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economic models for behaviour based upon material incentives. 61  In 
recent years more naval historians, led by Nicholas Rodger, have, 
however, moved on to debate a wider view of navies and one more 
congenial to economic historians which hypothesizes that at the top of 
any list of competitive advantages enjoyed by the Royal Navy over rival 
fleets was the extent and depth of the realm’s domestic resources and 
organizational capabilities mobilized and coordinated by the state, to 
construct, arm, man and maintain an increasingly large fleet of warships 
at sea for protracted periods of time. 62 
Clear and persistently higher levels of combined public and private 
investment in an infra-structure of buildings, docks, cranes, scaffolding, 
stores, tools, inventories of raw materials and efficiently managed 
shipyards, employing elastic supplies of labour skilled in the arts of 
designing, building, repairing and maintaining all kinds of ships (including 
warships for the Royal Navy) surely cumulated between 1651 and 1815 
into a significant comparative advantage for British trade and the British 
economy. 63  
Effective maritime power presupposed that navies could call upon 
elastic and lower cost supplies of the fixed capital, knowledge, 
technologies, raw materials, weapons, victuals, seamen, marines and all 
other inputs required to keep fleets of warships at/or ready for 
engagements with enemies at sea. In Britain naval demands declined,  
but never fell back to previous levels, even in interludes of peace, when 
breaks in connexions and learning curves could well have reduced 
productivity, particularly for those all important turnabout times for repairs 
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and refurbishment , which became vital in wartime when the pressures to 
keep warships constantly at sea intensified.64 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis under review here is not the relative 
scales and scope of on-shore logistical support systems and 
organizations embedded in the societies, economies and political 
systems of Europe’s ancien regimes, but their relative efficiencies. Across 
Europe, maritime powers maintained complex public organizations, 
ministries, admiralties, boards, directorates, commissions and other 
agencies of state,  at the centre of a process, to turn to economics jargon,  
of transforming inputs into outputs in order to fulfil missions at sea. 65 
In command of capital owned and workforces employed by the 
state, or more commonly, operating as bureaucratically organized 
coordinators working with private firms, the naval agencies of European 
states were charged by royal rulers, advised by aristocratic oligarchies or 
Parliaments of notables,  with responsibilities for building, hiring, repairing 
and maintaining warships, for procuring their cannon, ammunition and 
small arms, for supplying victuals, stores, tools, spare parts and other 
inputs necessary to maintain fleets at sea. Logistical support systems 
required for Europe’s national navies aspired, notwithstanding the case of 
the Netherlands and its five admiralties,  to become competent, 
specialized and efficient parts of a centralized command system, 
embodying various types of organization producing naval power in 
combined  public and public ownership and exemplifying very different 
rules and practices for the coordination and collaboration required 
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between governments and private enterprise in  order to supply and 
service national navies. 66  
Every European navy can be represented  as a more or less 
efficient partnership between a national state and a network of domestic 
private enterprises. Although states like Britain and the Dutch Republic 
with larger maritime sectors enjoyed a greater range of competitive 
options for collaboration, it will be difficult, even when the vast 
bibliography of historical literatures dealing with the operations of 
European ministries, admiralties, boards, commissions and other 
agencies established by states to mobilize and sustain navies is laid side 
by side, to reach valid conclusions about their relative levels of efficiency 
that are more than informed and negotiable judgments. 67 
Since properly designed exercises in productivity measurement are 
out of the questions, the view that navies of the Netherlands and Britain  
which were based upon large and increasing maritime sectors  enjoyed 
lower cost services from their infrastructures on shore are again plausible 
only as conjectures. 68  At present two provisional hypotheses, based 
upon a perusal of recent histories of the ministries, bureaucracies and 
agencies and firms concerned with the management of and supplies for 
navies in early modern Europe can be hazarded.  
First, that all public organizations involved with the construction, 
mobilization, coordination and administration of the warships and other 
resources required by fleets to become formidable at sea seem to have 
been afflicted,  some more than others, with all the vices of ancien 
regimes, long familiar to historians – but now expressed in the importable 
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taxonomies and vocabularies of new institutional economics. 69  
Corruption, rent seeking, percolation, moral hazards, adverse selection, 
principle agent problems of every conceivable kind obstructed the 
command and incentive systems for the execution of missions assigned  
to navies all the way down the line from rulers at the top through 
ministries, admiralties, boards and other departments of state to officers 
on the quarter deck. 70  
Second, the voluminous historiography of British naval 
administration, glowing with the success of its fleet, does not suggest that 
the kingdom’s Parliamentary regime, a supposedly optimal constitution for 
liberty with economic efficiency, could without closer investigation be 
plausibly represented as clearly more superior in sustaining effective 
naval administrations than autocratic Spain, absolutist France or the 
decentralized administration favoured by the Dutch republic. 71  British 
naval historians, together with neo-liberal economists, might wish, and 
indeed may assume, that to be the case. But it is not proven that the 
Admiralty and its several subsidiary Boards (acting, much of the time, as 
fiefdoms) effectively managed the construction, procurement and 
maintenance of warships; controlled the hire of vessels for transportation, 
victualled fleets, cared for sick and wounded seamen, solved the 
problems of coordination, control and collaboration with private firms or 
successfully aligned systems of incentives with their specialized missions 
for defence of the realm and the kingdom’s mercantilist objectives in ways 
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that were clearly more efficient than the systems operated by their foes 
and European rivals. 72   
After 1815 when nineteenth century political reformers engaged 
seriously with the clean up of “old corruption” they found nothing 
exceptional to praise in departments of state responsible for the navy. 
Many new institutional economic historians like the idea that 
Parliamentary regimes established more efficient departments of state 
and bureaucracies than their “despotic” rivals. Yet investigations by 
Parliamentary commissions and later by historians of the administrations 
running the navy, the army and most other departments of the 
Hanoverian-early Victorian state have found all the malign features of 
early modern governance to be as commonplace in Britain as the rest of 
Europe. 73   Sir Lewis Namier and his school, who at least understood the 
nature of politics, patronage and bureaucracy under an  ancien regime,  
suggested that British  administration worked better than regimes on the 
mainland because a Parliamentary  system allowed more scope for 
private enterprise and for the misappropriation of taxpayers’ money, 
which at least got things done.  In other words , at that time rents may 
well have been a higher component of public expenditure under 
Parliamentary than monarchical constitutions - persistently strapped for 
cash and more dependent upon aristocratic traditions of noble behaviour 
and service to the Crown. 74 
Political historians will recognize, but economists may not, all such 
inefficient features of early modern public administration as endemic to 
the transition from decentralized  polities to Weberian states and from 
                                                            
72 D. North and B. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitments: the Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England’, in Journal of 
Economic History, 49 (1989), pp. 803-832 
73 P. Mandler, Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform (Cambridge, 1990) 
74 L. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London, 1961) 
and M.A. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy (Hanover, 
1961) 
  34
crude to modern forms of management for large scale complex 
bureaucratic organizations with multiple missions and objectives. 75 
Before the nineteenth century revolutions in transport and 
communications and the diffusion of organizational systems and 
techniques to communicate, monitor and audit commands and 
information from central governments, all European states continued to 
act as “coordinators” of the authority and “mobilizers” of the resources 
required to sustain fleets of warships at sea or armies in the field. 76   
Whatever claims kings made to divine rights, absolute obedience or their 
parliaments of rich and self-interested notables asserted about  
sovereignty derived from the people, their capabilities for action remained 
bounded, much less by constitutional forms, and much more by 
technologically constrained imperfections in the organizational techniques 
available to implement policies and strategies efficiently. 77    Economic 
historians are now pursuing  hypotheses that suggest that ancien regimes 
that let in markets seem to have worked better than those who tried to 
deliver more autocratic and honest governance. Nevertheless, all states 
(Britain much  less so than any of its rivals) were fundamentally 
constrained by the lack of fiscal and financial resources to pay both the 
opportunity costs and the “rents” necessary to construct, mobilize and run 
an effective navy. 78  
Meanwhile this particular historical narrative, constructed around 
the familiar concepts and scaffolding of a macro production function, 
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offers nothing more than the following brief prospectus of plausible but 
speculative hypotheses for refinement and research. 
First, the rise of British naval supremacy from 1652 was path 
dependant and linked by loops of inter-connexions to the growth of the 
economy. Second, politically, the development of a strong navy depended 
upon a slow evolution (1453-1649) of a maritime strategy for the off-shore 
defence of an island realm, coupled with a relatively small army, which 
was  deployed  to maintain internal order in a less than united and 
potentially ungovernable kingdom. Third, the fiscal and financial 
institutions and political consensus for a sustained uplift in state 
expenditures on the largest standing fleet of warships in Europe was 
created during an interregnum of Republican rule, carried forward by the 
Stuarts and exploited to reach its full potential between the Glorious 
Revolution (1688) and the Congress of Vienna (1815). Fourth, the 
development and consolidation of the realm’s extensive maritime sector 
was protected by the Royal Navy which, in turn, promoted and sustained 
the largest fleet of battleships on call for defence and aggression in 
Europe and across the oceans of the world economy. Fifth, claims by 
British naval historians that the long run geopolitical and imperial success 
of the Royal Navy could be imputed to British technology, superior 
seamanship, bravery in battle, tactical knowledge, the Nelson factor, well 
designed economic incentives, more efficient logistical support and 
organizational capacities are, if such things could be quantified,  prima 
facie unlikely to have  generated the kind of a large, residual, implied by 
narratives of success that flow from the production of historical writing 
upon a provincialized and national basis. Sixth, British naval and 
mercantile  superiority can best be represented as the product of 
combined investment by the private and public sectors in a combined 
strategy for security, internal order and the extension of a well subsidized 
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merchant marine sector that led the economy towards a plateau of 
possibilities for precocious industrialization.  
Finally, this narrative (which remains negotiable) represents the 
institutions and culture promoting the First Industrial Revolution as an 
outcome of successful policies to promote domestic trade, shipping and 
commercial services required for the expansion of exports, imports and 
re-exports makes more plausible sense than its representation as the 
paradigm case for parliamentary governance, liberty, democracy and 
private enterprise. The  historical story behind the comparative 
advantages enjoyed by the British economy in the wake of an era of  
“mercantilist” policies to promote overseas commerce and 
industrialization emanated from kinetic energy and high wages,  
combined with geopolitical, power that is from coal and the Royal Navy. 
Though that thought may be heretical it certainly leaves less space to 
“economic and social histories from below”, but restores geopolitical 
strategy, fiscal policy and geographical  endowments to a central place in 
British economic history. It is, we suggest, the reductionist position upon 
which Bob Allen’s recent reinterpretation of  the Industrial Revolution may 
come to rest. 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
79 R. C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge, 
2009) 
 
 
 
  37
Bibliography: 
 
Acerra, M. et al., eds., Les marines de guerre européenes, XVII-XVIIIe  
siecles, Paris, 1998. 
Acerra, M., and A. Zysberg, L’essor des marines de guerre européenes 
vers 1680-vers 1790, Paris, 1997. 
Allen, R.C., The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, 
Cambridge,2009. 
Baugh, D.A., “Great Britain’s Blue Water Policy, 1689-1815,” International 
History Review, X (1988): 33-58. 
Baugh, D.A., “The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution,” in 
J.Hill, ed., Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, Oxford, 
1995: 120-160. 
Baugh, D.A., “Naval power. What gave the British Navy Superiority?” in L. 
Prados De La Escosura, ed., Exceptionalism and Industrialization. 
Britain and its European Rivals 1688-1815, Cambridge, 2004: 235-
257. 
Benjamin, D., and C. Thornberg, “Organization and Incentives in the Age 
of Sail,” in Explorations in Economic History, 2 (2007): 317-341. 
Benjamin, D., and A. Tifrea, “Learning by Dying: Combat Performance in 
the Age of Sail,” in Journal of Economic History, 67 (2007): 968-
1001. 
Black, J., and P. Woodfine, eds., The British Navy and use of Naval 
Power in the Eighteenth Century, Leicester, 1988. 
Boudriot, J., and H. Berti, L’artiIlerie der mer: marine francaise 1650-
1850, Paris, 1992. 
Bowen, H., and A. Gonzalez-Encisco, eds., Mobilizing Resources for 
War. Britain and Spain at work during the Early Modern Period, 
Pamplona, 2006. 
  38
Bromley, J.S., ed., The Manning of the Royal Navy, 1693-1873, London, 
1974. 
Bromley, J.S., Corsairs and Navies, London, 1987. 
Bruijn, J., The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 
New York, 1993. 
Crouzet, F., “The Second Hundred Years War with France. Some 
Reflexions,” French History, 10 (1996): 432-450. 
See Davids, K., “Maritime Labour in the Netherlands,” in P.C. van Royen, 
et al, eds., Those Emblems of Hell 
Davis, R., The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, Newton Abbot, 1972. 
Davis, R., The Rise of Atlantic Economies, London, 1973. 
Dull, J., The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms 
and Diplomacy, Princeton, 1975. 
Dull, J., The French Navy and the Seven Years War. France Overseas 
Studies in Empire and Decolonization, Chesham, 2005. 
Duffy, M., ed., Parameters of British Naval Power, Exeter, 1992. 
Earle, P., Sailors. English Merchant Seamen 1650-1775, London, 1998. 
Eder, M., Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy of the Seven Years 
War 1755-1763, Aldershot, 2004. 
Ekelund, R., and R. Tollison, eds., Politicized Economics, Monarchy, 
Monopoly and Mercantilism, College Station, Texas, 1997. 
Emsley, C., Crime and Society in England 1750-1900, Basingstoke, 1987. 
Ferreiro, L.D., Ships and Science. The Birth of Naval Architecture in the 
Scientific Revolution 1600-1800, Cambridge, Mass. 2006. 
Fujita, M, P. Krugman and A. Venables, The Spatial Economy, 
Cambridge 2000. 
Glete, J., Navies and Nations: warships, navies and state building in 
Europe and America 1500-1860, 2 vols., Stockholm, 1993. 
Goherel, H., Les tresoires generaux de la marine, Paris, 1965. 
  39
Goodman, D., Spanish Naval Power 1589-1665, Cambridge, 1996. 
Gradish, S., The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years 
War, London, 1980. 
Harding, R., The Evolution of the Sailing Navy 1509-1815, Basingstoke, 
1995. 
Harper, L., The English Navigation Laws, New York, 1939 
Harvey, A., Collision of Empires. Britain in Three World Wars, 1793-1945, 
London, 1992. 
Helpman, E, ed., General Purpose Technologies, Boston, 1998. 
Hepper, D., British Warship Losses in the Age of Sail 1650-1859, East 
Sussex, 1994. 
Hill, R., Prizes of War: Prize Law and the Royal Navy in the Napoleonic 
Wars 1793-1815, London, 1999. 
Hope, R., A New History of British Shipping, London, 1990. 
Jenkins, E., A History of the French Navy, London, 1973. 
Jurado Sanchez, J., “Military Spending, Spending Capacity and Budget 
Constraints in Eighteenth Century Britain and Spain,” in Revista 
Storia Economica, 2009 pp.141-74. 
Keegan, J., The Price of Admiralty: War at Sea from Man of War to 
Submarine, London, 1988. 
Knight, R., “The Introduction of Copper Sheathing into the Royal Navy, 
1779-1786,” Mariners Mirror, 59 (1973): 299-309. 
Knight, R., The Building and Maintenance of the British Fleet during the 
Anglo-French Wars 1688-1815,” in M. Acerra, et al., eds., Les 
marines de guerre européenes. XVII-XVIIIe siecles, Paris, 1985: 35-
50. 
Knight, R., “The Fleets at Trafalgar. The Margin of Superiority,” in D. 
Cannadine, ed., Trafalgar in History, New York, 2006: 61-78. 
Korner, M., “Expenditure,” in R. Bonney, ed., Economic Systems and 
State Finance, Oxford, 1995: 393-404. 
  40
Lavery, B., ed., The Ships of the Line, 2 vols., London, 1983-84. 
Lavery, B., Ships of the Line. The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-
1850, London, 1983. 
Lavery, B., The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War 1660-1815, 
London, 1987. 
Lavery, B., Nelson’s Navy. The Ships, the Men and Organization 1793-
1815, London, 1989. 
Lavery, B., ed., Shipboard Life and Organization 1731-1815, Aldershot, 
1998. 
Levy, J., Wars in the Modern Great Power System 1495-1975, Lexington, 
1983. 
Lewis, M., A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815, London, 1960. 
Lincolns, M., Representing the Royal Navy. British Sea Power  1750-181, 
Aldershot, 2002. 
Lloyd, C., The British Seaman: a Social Survey, London, 1968. 
Lucassen, J., and R. Unger, “Labour Productivity in Ocean Shipping 
1500-1850,” in International Journal of Maritime History, XII, 2 
(2000): 127-124. 
Lyon, D., The Sailing Navy. All the ships of the Royal Navy, Built, 
Purchased and Captured, Conway, 1993. 
Mahon, A., Types of Naval Officers drawn from the History of the British 
Navy, Boston, 1904. 
Mandler, P., Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform, Cambridge, 
1990. 
Marion, M., Histoire Financière de la France depuis 1715, Paris, 1927-28. 
McCusker, J., Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World, 
London, 1997. 
Menard, C., and M.N. Shirley, eds., Handbook for New Institutional 
Economics, Boston, 2005. 
  41
Meyer, J., and M. Acerra, Histoire de la marine francaise des origins a 
nos jours, Rennes, 1994. 
Modelski, B.G., and W. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, Seattle, 
1993. 
Morris, R., Naval Power and British Culture. Public Trust and Government 
Ideology, Aldershot, 2004. 
Namier, L., The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, 
London, 1961. 
North, D., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge, 1990. 
North, D., and B. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitments: the 
Evolution of Institutions governing public choice in Seventeenth 
Century England,” in Journal of Economic History, 49 (1989): 803-
832. 
O’Brien, P.K., and A. Clesse, eds., Two Hegemonies. Britain 1846-1914 
and the United States 1941-2001, Aldershot, 2002. 
O’Brien, P. K., “Fiscal Exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European 
Rivals from Civil War to Triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo,” in D. 
Winch and P. O’Brien, eds., The Political Economy of British 
Historical Experience 1658-1914, Oxford, 2002. 
P.K. O’Brien, “Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution,” Department 
of Economic History London School of Economics GEHN Working 
Paper 23/06, (2006). 
O’Brien, P.K., “Fiscal and Financial Preconditions for the Rise of British 
Naval Hegemony 1485-1815,” in J. Backhaus and N. Rodger, eds., 
Navies and State Formation, forthcoming 2009. 
O’Brien, P.K., “The History, Nature and Economic Significance of an 
Exceptional Fiscal State for the Growth of the British Economy 
1453-1815 “ forthcoming in Economic History Review, (2010) 
  42
O’Brien, P.K., and X. Duran, The Royal Navy and the Industrial 
Revolution, forthcoming 2010. 
Palmer, M., “The Sails Right Hand : Commerce and Control in the Age of 
the Fighting Sail 1652-1827,” in Journal of Military History, 61 
(1997): 679-765. 
Palmer, S., and D. Williams, “British Sailors 1775-1870,” in van Royen et 
al., Those Emblems of Hell. in Research in Maritime History, 13, St 
John’s, Newfoundland International Economic History, 1997: 41-72 
Prendergast, C., “The Provision of Incentives in Firms,” in Journal of 
Economic Literature, 37 (1999): 7-63. 
Riley, J., The Seven Years Wars and the Old Regime in France, 
Princeton, 1986. 
Roberts, D.H., ed., Eighteenth Century Shipbuilding remarks on the 
Navies of the English and the Dutch, Rotherfield, 1992. 
Rodger, N.A.M., The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy, 
New York, 1986. 
Rodger, N.A.M., “Sea Power and Empire,” in P. Marshall, ed., The Oxford 
History of the British Empire, vol. 2, Oxford, 1998: 169-183. 
Rodger, N.A.M., “Form and Function in European Navies 1660-1815,” in 
L. Arkveld et al, eds., in Maritiem-historische Studies, Amsterdam, 
2003: 85-97. 
Rodger, N.A.M., “Queen Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea Power in English 
History,” in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 14 (2004): 
153-174. 
Rodger, N.A.M., The Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain, 
vol. 2 1649-1815, London, 2004. 
Sanchez-Torres, R., ed., War, State and Development. Fiscal Military 
States in the Eighteenth Century, Pamplona, 2007. 
Sanchez-Torres, R., “Possibilities and Limits: Testing the Fiscal Military 
State in the Anglo-Spanish War of 1779-83,” in R. Torres Sanchez, 
  43
  44
ed., War, State and Development. Fiscal Military States in the 
Eighteenth Century, Navarra, 2007: 437-460. 
Scammell, G., Seafaring, Sailors and Trade 1450-1750, Aldershot, 2003. 
Starkey, D.J., British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century, 
Exeter, 1990. 
Sondhaus, L., Naval Warfare 1815-1914, London, 2001. 
Syrett, D., and P. Dinardo, The Commisssioned Sea Officers of the Royal 
Navy, London, 1994. 
Thompson, G., Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereignty, Princeton, 1994. 
Tirole, Jean The Theory of Industrial Organization, Boston, 2000. 
Tunstall, B., and N. Tracy, eds., Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail. The 
Evolution of Fighting Tactics 1650-1815, Annapolis, 1990. 
Unger, R.W., Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800, Amsterdam, 1978. 
Unger, R.W., “Warships, Cargo Ships and Adam Smith: trade and 
government in the Eighteenth century,” in The Mariners Mirror, 92, 
1 (2006): 41-59. 
Van Royden, P.C., et al, eds., “Those Emblems of Hell? European Sailors 
in the Maritime Labour Market 1570-1870,” in Research in Maritime 
History, 13, St John’s, Newfoundland International Economic 
History, 1997. 
Verge-Franchesci, M., Les officiers generaux de la marine royale, 1715-
74, Paris, 1990. 
Wareham, T., The Star Captains Frigate Command in the Napoleonic 
Wars, Annapolis, 2001. 
Warner, O., Fighting Sail: Three Hundred Years of Warfare at sea, 
London, 1979. 
Wilson, J.C., Bureaucracy. What Government Agencies do and why they 
do it, New York, 1989. 
Wilkinson, C., The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century, 
London, 2004. 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
ECONOMIC HISTORY DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS  
(from 2006 onwards) For a full list of titles visit our webpage at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/  
 
 
2006 
 
WP93 Harbingers of Dissolution?  Grain Prices, Borders and 
Nationalism in the Hapsburg Economy before the First World 
War 
 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf 
 
WP94 Rodney Hilton, Marxism and the Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism 
 S. R. Epstein 
 Forthcoming in C. Dyer, P. Cross, C. Wickham (eds.) 
Rodney Hilton’s Middle Ages, 400-1600 Cambridge UP 2007 
 
WP95 Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit. The 
Management of Britain’s National Debt, 1756-1815 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien 
 
WP96 Gresham on Horseback: The Monetary Roots of Spanish 
American Political Fragmentation in the Nineteenth Century 
 Maria Alejandra Irigoin 
 
 
2007 
 
WP97 An Historical Analysis of the Expansion of Compulsory 
Schooling in Europe after the Second World War 
 Martina Viarengo 
 
WP98 Universal Banking Failure? An Analysis of the Contrasting 
Responses of the Amsterdamsche Bank and the 
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging to the Dutch Financial Crisis of 
the 1920s 
 Christopher Louis Colvin 
 
WP99 The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State: 
Taxation for the Wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France, 1793-1815. 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien 
WP100 Origins of Catch-up Failure: Comparative Productivity Growth in 
the Hapsburg Empire, 1870-1910 
 Max-Stephan Schulze 
 
WP101 Was Dick Whittington Taller Than Those He Left Behind?  
Anthropometric Measures, Migration and the Quality of life in 
Early Nineteenth Century London 
 Jane Humphries and Tim Leunig 
 
WP102 The Evolution of Entertainment Consumption and the 
Emergence of Cinema, 1890-1940 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP103 Is Social Capital Persistent? Comparative Measurement in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
 Marta Felis Rota 
 
WP104 Structural Change and the Growth Contribution of Services: 
How Motion Pictures Industrialized US Spectator Entertainment 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP105 The Jesuits as Knowledge Brokers Between Europe and China 
(1582-1773): Shaping European Views of the Middle Kingdom 
 Ashley E. Millar 
 
WP106 Regional Income Dispersion and Market Potential in the Late 
Nineteenth Century Habsburg Empire 
 Max-Stephan Schulze 
 
 
2008 
 
WP107 ‘The Big Problem of the Petty Coins’, and how it could be 
solved in the late Middle Ages 
 Oliver Volckart 
 
WP108 The Anglo-German Industrial Productivity Puzzle, 1895-1935: A 
Restatement and a Possible Resolution 
 Albrecht Ritschl 
 
WP109 The History, Nature and Economic Significance of an 
Exceptional Fiscal State for the Growth of the British Economy, 
1453-1815 
 Patrick O’Brien 
WP110 The Economic History of Sovereignty: Communal 
Responsibility, the Extended Family, and the Firm 
 Lars Boerner and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
WP111 A Stakeholder Empire: The Political Economy of Spanish 
Imperial Rule in America 
 Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin 
 
WP112 The U.S. Business Cycle, 1867-1995: Dynamic Factor Analysis 
vs. Reconstructed National Accounts 
 Albrecht Ritschl, Samad Sarferaz and Martin Uebele 
 
WP113 Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s 
 Barry Eichengreen and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
 
2009 
 
WP114 War and Wealth: Economic Opportunity Before and After the 
Civil War, 1850-1870 
 Taylor Jaworski 
 
WP115 Business Cycles and Economic Policy, 1914-1945: A Survey 
 Albrecht Ritschl and Tobias Straumann 
 
WP116 The Impact of School Provision on Pupil Attendance: Evidence 
From the Early 20th Century 
 Mary MacKinnon and Chris Minns 
 
WP117 Why Easter Island Collapsed: An Answer for an Enduring 
Question 
 Barzin Pakandam 
 
WP118 Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Apprenticeship in 
Early Modern Europe 
 Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis 
 
WP119 Time and Productivity Growth in Services: How Motion Pictures 
Industrialized Entertainment 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP120 The Pattern of Trade in Seventeenth-Century Mughal India: 
Towards An Economic Explanation 
 Jagjeet Lally 
WP121 Bairoch Revisited. Tariff Structure and Growth in the Late 19th 
Century 
 Antonio Tena-Junguito 
 
WP122 Evolution of Living Standards and Human Capital in China in 
18-20th Centuries: Evidences from Real Wage and 
Anthropometrics 
 Joerg Baten, Debin Ma, Stephen Morgan and Qing Wang 
 
WP123 Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925: in 
Comparison with Europe, Japan, and India 
 Robert C. Allen, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Debin Ma, Christine 
Moll-Murata, Jan Luiten van Zanden 
 
WP124 Law and Economic Change in Traditional China: A Comparative 
Perspective 
 Debin Ma 
 
WP125 Leaving Home and Entering Service: The Age of 
Apprenticeship in Early Modern London 
 Patrick Wallis, Cliff Webb and Chris Minns 
 
WP126 After the Great Debasement, 1544-51: Did Gresham’s Law 
Apply? 
 Ling-Fan Li 
 
WP127 Did Globalization Aid Industrial Development in Colonial India? 
A Study of Knowledge Transfer in the Iron Industry 
 Tirthankar Roy 
 
WP128 The Education and Training of Gentry Sons in Early-Modern 
England 
 Patrick Wallis and Cliff Webb 
 
WP129 Does Trade Explain Europe’s Rise? Geography, Market Size 
and Economic Development 
 Roman Studer 
 
WP130 Depression Econometrics: A FAVAR Model of Monetary Policy 
During the Great Depression 
 Pooyan Amir Ahmadi and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
 
 
WP131 The Economic Legacies of the ‘Thin White Line’: Indirect Rule 
and the Comparative Development of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Peter Richens 
 
WP132 Money, States and Empire: Financial Integration Cycles and 
Institutional Change in Central Europe, 1400-1520 
 David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart 
 
WP133 Regional Market Integration in Italy During the Unification 
(1832-1882) 
 Anna Missiaia 
 
 
2010 
 
WP134 Total Factor Productivity for the Royal Navy from Victory at 
Texal (1653) to Triumph at Trafalgar (1805) 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien FBA and Xavier Duran 
 
 
